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THE RESOURCE CURSE WITHOUT
NATURAL RESOURCES: EXPECTATIONS
OF RESOURCE BOOMS AND THEIR IMPACT
JĘDRZEJ GEORGE FRYNAS, GEOFFREY WOOD AND TIMOTHY HINKS*
ABSTRACT
Many resource-rich countries have experienced a range of negative economic
and political effects from natural resource extraction, often lumped together
as the ‘resource curse’. This article investigates to what extent expectations
of future natural resource booms in São Tomé e Príncipe and Madagascar
led to ‘resource curse’ effects, even though these countries did not experi-
ence the expected booms. It finds that both countries experienced resource
curse effects as a result of future expectations, including volatile economic
growth and eroded governance. The article demonstrates that shared aspira-
tions and expectations alone may make for material political and economic
outcomes even when they become visibly divorced from reality. Thus, there
is much more to resource curse effects than simply the product of the mater-
ial extraction of natural endowments. At a time of extremely volatile prices
for primary commodities, and the relatively easy availability of investment
capital and credit to support speculative ventures that in turn incentivize
resource hype, it is likely that a growing number of countries may suffer the
malign effects of a resource curse without natural resource extraction.
MANY RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES have experienced a range of negative
economic and political effects of resource extraction, often lumped
together as the ‘resource curse’.1 However, the resource curse literature
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1. Useful reviews are Jeffrey A. Frankel, ‘The natural resource curse: A survey’ (Working
Paper 15836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2010); Frederick
van der Ploeg, ‘Natural resources: Curse or blessing?’, Journal of Economic Literature 49
(2011), pp. 366–420; Michael L. Ross, ‘What have we learned about the resource curse?’
(Working Paper, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 2014).
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has failed almost entirely to consider possible resource curse effects in
countries where preliminary planning or exploratory extractive work was
carried out but ultimately no significant extraction of natural resources
took place. This article investigates possible resource curse effects in
countries where promised resource booms failed to materialize, looking at
the cases of São Tomé e Príncipe (STP) and Madagascar.
Scholarship in economics strongly suggests that individuals act on the
basis of rational future expectations and macro-level phenomena cannot
be satisfactorily explained without taking into account rational expecta-
tions.2 By extension, we hypothesize that political and economic decision
makers in countries holding the promise of future extraction of natural
resources would take rational decisions on the basis of an expectation of a
resource boom – as would decision makers in countries where the extrac-
tion of natural resources actually takes place. Indeed, previous studies on
countries such as Uganda and STP have demonstrated that the promise
of a resource boom raised high expectations of potential future economic
benefits among African and foreign decision makers that could be difficult
to match in reality.3
The resource curse thesis suggests that countries with a high depend-
ence on natural resources suffer from negative macroeconomic and
macro-political effects.4 The resource curse thesis has been challenged.5
Indeed, some writers suggest that the effects are beneficial, particularly
with regard to economic growth.6 In response to such critiques,
2. John F. Muth, ‘Rational expectations and the theory of price movements’, Econometrica
29 (1961), pp. 315–35; Robert E. Lucas Jr, ‘Expectations and the neutrality of money’,
Journal of Economic Theory 4 (1972), pp. 102–24; Stanley Fischer (ed.), Rational expectations
and economic policy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1980).
3. Richard Vokes, ‘The politics of oil in Uganda’, African Affairs 111, 443 (2012), pp. 303–14;
Julius Kiiza, Lawrence Bategeka, and Sarah Ssewanyana, ‘Righting resource-curse wrongs in
Uganda: The political economy of oil discovery and the management of popular expecta-
tions’, Mawazo 10, 3 (2011), pp. 183–203; Gisa Weszkalnys, ‘Hope and oil: Expectations in
São Tomé e Príncipe’, Review of African Political Economy 35 (2008), pp. 473–82; Gisa
Weszkalnys, ‘Anticipating oil: The temporal politics of a disaster yet to come’, Sociological
Review 62, S1 (2014), pp. 211–35.
4. There are some differences of opinion as to which ‘resources’ contribute to the resource
curse, but resource curse studies widely agree that oil, gas, and mineral resources are behind
the resource curse, while most studies agree that agricultural resources do not have signifi-
cant resource curse impacts. The empirical evidence of resource curse effects is most robust
for oil and gas. Ross, ‘What have we learned about the resource curse?’
5. Christa Brunnschweiler, ‘Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institu-
tions, and economic growth’, World Development 36 (2008), pp. 399–419; Michael Alexeev
and Robert Conrad, ‘The elusive curse of oil’, Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (2009),
pp. 586–98.
6. Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, ‘Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A
reappraisal of the resource curse’, American Political Science Review 105 (2001), pp. 1–26;
Tiago V. de V. Cavalcanti, Kamiar Mohaddes, and Mehdi Raissi, ‘Growth, development
and natural resources: New evidence using a heterogeneous panel analysis’, Quarterly Review
of Economics and Finance 51 (2011), pp. 305–18; Brunnschweiler, ‘Cursing the blessings?’;
Alexeev and Conrad, ‘The elusive curse of oil’.
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proponents of the resource curse thesis shifted their attention to possible
adverse political consequences.7 Other studies suggest that resource curse
effects are subject to a number of contingencies, including the nature of
governance (notably, democratic regimes are significantly less prone to
such effects) and the resource type (notably, oil-producing countries are
significantly more prone to such effects).8 Indeed, some countries such as
Norway and Canada have evaded the resource curse to a large extent; it
could be argued that this was due to better governance or already existing
economic diversification.9 Hence the presence of resource curse effects,
or their absence, arguably reflects relatively unique and complex sets of
circumstances including inter alia the type of natural resources, the struc-
ture of the domestic economy, and the political and corporate governance
regimes.10 More recently, scholars have re-examined the available statis-
tical data, arguing that the previous findings on positive or insignificant
effects of resource windfalls were contingent upon the panel of countries
selected and the time period under review, and that occasionally the nega-
tive effects may have been underestimated.11 In addition to the debates
on economic and political effects, a third strand of the literature suggests
that resource-rich countries are more prone to civil conflicts.12 We shall
briefly summarize these three aspects of the resource curse.
First, the inflow of resource revenues can lead to the so-called Dutch
Disease phenomenon: the appreciation of a country’s currency exchange
rate, which can reduce exports of agricultural and manufacturing goods.
While empirical evidence does not necessarily suggest that resource
wealth leads to lower economic growth, the natural resource sectors can
draw capital, labour, and entrepreneurial activity away from non-resource
7. Paul Collier, ‘The political economy of natural resources’, Social Research 77 (4) (2010),
pp. 1105–32; Michael Ross, The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of
nations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2012).
8. Sambit Bhattacharya and Roland Hodler, ‘Natural resources, democracy, and corrup-
tion’, European Economic Review 54 (2010), pp. 608–21; Ross, ‘What have we learned about
the resource curse?’; Anne Boschini, Jan Pettersson and Jesper Roine, ‘Resource curse or not:
A question of appropriability’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109 (2007), pp. 593–617;
Ross, ‘What have we learned about the resource curse?’
9. Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, ‘Institutions and the resource curse’,
Economic Journal 116, 508 (2006), pp. 1–20; James Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry
Verdier, ‘Political foundations of the resource curse’, Journal of Development Economics 79, 2
(2006), pp. 447–68.
10. Ross, The oil curse; Ross, ‘What have we learned about the resource curse?’; Benjamin
Smith, Hard times in the land of plenty: Oil politics in Iran and Indonesia (Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, NY, 2007).
11. See Jørgen Andersen and Michael Ross, ‘The big oil change: A closer look at the
Haber–Menaldo analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 47 (2014), pp. 993–1021; David
Wiens, Paul Poast, and William Roberts Clark, ‘The political resource curse: An empirical
re-evaluation’, Political Research Quarterly 67 (2014), pp. 783–94.
12. Ross, The oil curse; Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, ‘May God give us chaos, so that we can plun-
der: A critique of “resource curse” and conflict theories’, Development 49, 3 (2006), pp. 14–21.
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sectors and thereby stifle their development.13 Based on evidence from 41
resource-exporting countries during 1970–2006, a recent study suggests
that, in response to one dollar of natural resource revenue, non-resource
exports decrease by approximately 75 cents and imports increase by
25 cents, and that the windfall effect was most severe for countries with a
large manufacturing sector.14
Second, the inflow of resource revenues can undermine good govern-
ance and the quality of institutions. Given their dependence on extractive
revenues, governments in resource-rich countries have greater incentives
to focus their efforts on political competition to capture resource rents
and on patronage to pay off political supporters to stay in power, rather
than on encouraging the creation of wealth by improving the quality of
societal institutions.15 Empirical evidence strongly suggests inter alia that
resource-rich countries tend to suffer from higher levels of corruption
than non-resource rich countries, and that resource abundance helps
autocratic regimes to remain in power.16
Third, resource revenues provide fewer incentives for human cooper-
ation and tend to be less affected by violent conflicts than other economic
sectors, as extractive firms can build the necessary infrastructure, provide
their own security and – being enclave economies – rely less on local busi-
ness linkages. At the same time, the prospects of gaining control over
resource revenues may fuel the activities of rebel groups, potential coup
leaders, and other violent forms of political opposition. Empirical evi-
dence strongly suggests that the presence of natural resources significantly
increases the threat of armed conflict, even if this impact is subject to a
number of contingencies, among which the location of resources is
13. van der Ploeg, ‘Natural resources: Curse or blessing?’; Kareem Ismail, ‘The structural
manifestation of the “Dutch Disease”: The case of oil exporting countries’ (Working Paper
10/103, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 2010); Milan Brahmbhatt,
Otaviano Canuto, and Ekaterina Vostroknutova, ‘Dealing with Dutch Disease’, Economic
Premise 16 (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010).
14. Torfinn Harding and Anthony J. Venables, ‘The implications of natural resource
exports for non-resource trade’ (Research Paper 103, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of
Resource Rich Economies, Oxford University, 2013).
15. Richard Auty, ‘Patterns of rent-extraction and deployment in developing countries:
Implications for governance, economic policy and performance’, in George Mavrotas and
Anthony Shorrocks (eds), Advancing development: Core themes in global economics (Palgrave,
London, 2007), pp. 555–77; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, ‘Political foundations of the
resource curse’.
16. Andrea Petermann, Juan Ignacio Guzman, and John E. Tilton, ‘Mining and corrup-
tion’, Resources Policy 32 (2007), pp. 91–103; Ivar Kolstad and Tina Søreide, ‘Corruption in
natural resource management: Implications for policy makers’, Resources Policy 34 (2009),
pp. 214–26, p. 214; Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes, ‘Oil and autocratic
regime survival’, British Journal of Political Science 45 (2015), pp. 287–306; Anar K.
Ahmadov, ‘Oil, democracy, and context: A meta-analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 47
(2014), pp. 1238–67.
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crucial.17 For example, if resources are located inside the actual conflict
zone, a conflict can be significantly exacerbated, but this effect is likely to
be slight if oil is found offshore.18
The few previous studies that addressed the effects of future expecta-
tions either based their conclusions on economic experiments and/or
investigated a single issue related to the resource curse such as corruption
or exchange rates. To our knowledge, no previous study has undertaken a
comparative investigation of a range of resource curse effects issuing from
future expectations in the absence of actual resource extraction. This art-
icle aims to fill the gap.
Our study suggests that societies may experience resource curse effects
without necessarily experiencing genuine resource windfalls; rather,
anticipation of future resources may lead to at least some of the adverse
effects of the resource curse. In particular, we encountered negative
effects in terms of political stability and quality of governance, and signifi-
cantly greater macroeconomic volatility. Although we did not find much
tangible evidence for enhanced levels of violent conflict, this study does
highlight the corrosive effects of resource hype, at a time when extremely
volatile prices for primary commodities and the relatively easy availability
of investment capital and credit to support speculative ventures increase
the scope for the negative effects of future expectations.
Expectations of resource booms in historical and temporal terms
The resource curse literature focuses on the impact of actual resource
extraction, but the idea that expectations of future resource revenues may
lead to negative macroeconomic effects should not come as a surprise to
those familiar with history. For instance, in late-sixteenth-century Spain,
the ‘expectation of future mineral discoveries prompted factors of produc-
tion to be diverted from export industries, such as fine wool and manufac-
tures, and into the extraction and service industries associated with the
silver trade’.19 Future expectations related to resource booms created prop-
erty bubbles, as in the case of Australia in the late nineteenth century.20
17. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘On the economic causes of civil war’, Oxford
Economic Papers 50 (1998), pp. 563–73; Macartan Humphreys, ‘Natural resources, conflict,
and conflict resolution: Uncovering the mechanisms’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49
(2005), pp. 508–37.
18. Päivi Lujala, ‘The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural
resources’, Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010), pp. 15–28; Ross, ‘What have we learned
about the resource curse?’
19. Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Institutions and the resource curse in
early modern Spain’, in Elhanan Helpman (ed.), Institutions and economic performance
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008), p. 134.
20. Geoffrey Blainey, The rush that never ended: A history of Australian mining (Melbourne
University Press, Melbourne, 1963).
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In accounting for the resource curse, some scholars have noted the role
of expectations in aggravating its effects. Richard Auty pointed out that
the neglect of non-resource sectors resulted ‘in part from over-optimistic
expectations for both mineral prices and RBI [resource-based industry]
output’.21 Terry-Lynn Karl and Ian Gary asserted that ‘oil booms raise
expectations and increase appetites for spending’ and that, as a result,
‘governments dramatically increase public spending based on unrealistic
revenue projections’.22 They also pointed out that ‘the expectations cre-
ated by oil riches and the reality produced is a dangerous formula for dis-
order and war’.23
Several recent studies specifically explore the mechanisms by which
expectations of a resource boom may lead to adverse economic and
political outcomes. Pedro Vicente suggests that expectations of an oil
boom can increase corruption and can lead to a change in the alloca-
tion of public resources.24 Others argue that expectations of future
resource revenues can cause economic effects such as changes in the
real exchange rate.25 Furthermore, unmatched expectations of higher
personal incomes among the population can cause popular discontent
and lead to societal conflicts.26 This literature suggests that expecta-
tions of future resource booms can have different negative impacts on
the economy, government policy, and violent conflict – even in the
absence of the actual exploitation of natural resources. As Gisa
Weszkalnys notes, ‘occasionally, it is thought to be just the expectation
of oil that causes the curse to happen’.27
However, prior scholarship related to future expectations either based
its conclusions on economic experiments and/or investigated a single issue
related to the resource curse, such as corruption or exchange rates. To
our knowledge, our study is the first to consider a range of resource curse
effects deriving from future expectations in the absence of actual resource
extraction.
21. Richard M. Auty, Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis
(Routledge, London, 1993), p. 20.
22. Terry-Lynn Karl and Ian Gary, ‘The global record’, in Foreign Policy in Focus
(Interhemispheric Resource Center/Institute for Policy Studies/SEEN, Washington, DC and
Silver City, NM, 2004), pp. 35–42, p. 36.
23. Terry-Lynn Karl and Ian Gary, Bottom of the barrel: Africa’s oil boom and the poor
(Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore, MD, 2004), p. 18.
24. Pedro C. Vicente, ‘Does oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West
Africa’, Journal of Development Economics 92 (2010), pp. 28–38.
25. Aziz Hayat, Bahodir Ganiev, and Xueli Tang, ‘Expectations of future income and real
exchange rate movements’, Journal of Banking and Finance 37 (2013), pp. 1274–85.
26. Gerhard Toews, ‘Inflated expectations and natural resource booms: Evidence from
Kazakhstan’ (Research Paper 109, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich
Economies, Oxford University, 2013).
27. Weszkalnys, ‘Anticipating oil’.
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Given that the resource curse has been a phenomenon noted for over
twenty-five years,28 why have the malign consequences of prospective, but
not real, resource booms only become visible relatively recently? Is this
because the impact of prospective resource booms has been so insignifi-
cant, or is it because the current theories that are used to explain the
processes by which natural resources translate into different outcomes
(such as rentier-type theories, or conflict theories) fail to conceptualize
adequately the role of cognition and expectations? Consistent with recent
contributions on expectations in resource-rich countries including STP
and Madagascar,29 we argue that – compared with the most popular cur-
rent theories in the resource curse literature – theoretical insights on the
link between natural resources and speculation/anticipation may provide
superior explanations of the effects of resource boom expectations.
Many authors writing from the perspectives of economics, sociology,
and other disciplines argue that speculation and anticipation are integral
elements of decision making, which involves uncertainty and is shaped by
future expectations.30 Some writers point to the increased importance of
economic speculation and anticipation in recent decades due to global
economic shifts. In particular, Geoffrey Wood and Christel Lane argue
that in historical terms we have experienced a long economic crisis since
the early 1970s, a period of volatile and unstable growth interposed with
recession, triggered by the oil shocks of the early 1970s and underlined by
a long transition away from petroleum resources.31 They suggest that the
high or volatile natural resource prices are accompanied by a greater avail-
ability of speculative capital (in the form of rentiers, sovereign wealth
funds, and others), encouraging a greater amount of hype and gambling
on future resource booms, drawing in or sidelining other players in a
process of accumulation that has much to do with debt leverage and the
inflating of the value of concessions, and little to do with material
28. For a consolidation of the early resource curse literature, see Richard Auty, ‘Industrial
policy reform in six large newly industrializing countries: The resource curse thesis’, World
Development 22, 1 (1994), pp. 11–26.
29. Weszkalnys, ‘Anticipating oil’; Andrew Walsh, ‘In the wake of things: Speculating in and
about sapphires in northern Madagascar’, American Anthropologist 106 (2004), pp. 225–37.
30. See, for example, Brian Kantor, ‘Rational expectations and economic thought’, Journal
of Economic Literature 17 (1979), pp. 1422–41; Adeline Delavande, Xavier Giné, and David
McKenzie, ‘Measuring subjective expectations in developing countries: A critical review and
new evidence’, Journal of Development Economics 94 (2011), pp. 151–63; Vincanne Adams,
Michelle Murphy, and Adele E. Clarke, ‘Anticipation: Technoscience, life, affect, temporal-
ity’, Subjectivity 28 (2009), pp. 246–65.
31. Geoffrey Wood and Christel Lane, ‘Institutions, change and diversity’, in Christel
Lane and Geoffrey Wood (eds), Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism (Routledge,
London, 2012), pp. 1–32; Christel Lane and Geoffrey Wood, ‘Capitalist diversity: Work and
employment relations’, in Adrian Wilkinson, Geoffrey Wood, and Richard Deeg (eds),
Oxford handbook of employment relations: Comparative employment systems (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2014), pp. 156–72.
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production. These effects have been accentuated particularly in the petrol-
eum industry, with rising speculative activity and debt leverage.32
Following such analysis, the speculative long energy-transition thesis would
be consistent with findings in the most recent literature that the negative
effects of the resource curse have become more pronounced since the
1980s and that they are most pronounced in the petroleum sector.33
However, structural changes in the global capitalist ecosystem represent
only half of the picture. Bob Jessop argues that whilst there are dominant
forces and pressures in the global capitalist ecosystem, there remains
much variety within and between contexts. Each national and regional
framework is associated with its own distinct forms of conflict and com-
promise; only in some circumstances does this lead to a ‘spatial-temporal
fix’ associated with structural coherence in the national political econ-
omy.34 As Weszkalnys notes, anticipation of resource windfalls can lead to
the rapid development of new and not always coherent or well-designed
regulatory structures, as well as undermine existing social ties and trust
relations – which, in turn, would preclude the type of institutional align-
ment and coupling that would make stable growth possible.35
Whether or not the reader is convinced by arguments of long energy
transitions, it is evident that the global political economy has become a
much more uncertain place, and that the intersection between global
trends and not always coherent national institutional arrangements sug-
gests great unpredictability.36 Jane Guyer argues that bleak circumstances
of ‘enforced pessimism’ encourage imagination, planning, and hoping
about an abundant ‘near future’ of social and material prosperity, that
encourages the leverage of debt and the selling of hope.37 Vincanne
Adams and colleagues conclude that anticipation represents the assump-
tion that the boundaries of the possible have been extended, creating a
sense of urgency among agents to leverage the new opportunities.38 In dif-
ferent ways, these studies provide a conceptual arsenal that can be used to
understand better the mechanisms through which mere future expecta-
tions of resource booms may translate into real world outcomes.
32. Richard Heinberg, Snake oil: How fracking’s false promise of plenty imperils our future
(Clairview, West Hoathly, 2014); Antonie Kotze, ‘Debt, defaults and crises: A historical per-
spective’ available at SSRN 2587342 (2015).
33. Andersen and Ross, ‘The big oil change’; Ross, ‘What have we learned about the
resource curse?’
34. Bob Jessop, ‘Rethinking the diversity and variability of capital’, in Christel Lane and
Geoffrey Wood (eds), Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism (Routledge, London,
2012), p. 216.
35. Weszkalnys, ‘Anticipating oil’; Jessop, ‘Rethinking the diversity and variability of
capital’.
36. Jessop, ‘Rethinking the diversity and variability of capital’, p. 216.
37. Jane Guyer, ‘Prophecy and the near future’, American Ethnologist 34, 3 (2007),
pp. 409–21.
38. Adams et al., ‘Anticipation’.
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Resource boom expectations in STP and Madagascar
Before we begin analysing the impact of resource boom expectations, it is
necessary to pinpoint the evolution of such expectations in both countries.
In STP, resource boom expectations began around 1997 when the gov-
ernment signed an agreement with a small US firm ERHC to negotiate
on its behalf with potential foreign investors for the award of oil licences.
In 1998, the government and ERHC created a joint venture company,
Sociedade Nacional de Petroleos de São Tomé e Principe (STPETRO),
with a 51 percent government shareholding. STPETRO signed an agree-
ment with the multinational Mobil (later ExxonMobil) to evaluate the oil
and gas potential in the country’s offshore area.39 As Mobil set out to
evaluate the country’s geological potential over 18 months, the govern-
ment negotiated the establishment of a Joint Development Zone in the
most promising offshore area between STP and Nigeria to be jointly
administered by the two countries; these negotiations were concluded in
late 2000.40 Therefore, the period from 1997 to 2000 can be assumed to
mark the beginning of resource boom expectations in STP.41
In contrast to STP, there were at least two waves of resource boom
expectation in Madagascar that related to different types of resources. In
the mid- to late-1990s, Madagascar expected a resource boom in sap-
phires. In marked contrast to the oil sector in STP that required capital-
intensive advanced technologies, sapphires in Madagascar were found in
alluvial deposits and any person with a spade and simple tools was able to
mine for sapphires. Hence, an artisanal sapphire mining rush took place:
‘Rumours of sapphires the size of footballs and of fortunes made in a sin-
gle day have made Ilakaka irresistible.’42 At the epicentre of the rush, the
population of Ilakaka increased from 30 to roughly 100,000 during the
period 1998 to 2000.43 Meanwhile, the Malagasy government passed laws
regulating natural resource exploitation in 1996 (petroleum) and 1999
(mining).44 Therefore, the period from 1996 to 1999 marked the begin-
ning of resource boom expectations in Madagascar.
39. Jędrzej George Frynas, Geoffrey Wood, and R. M. S. Soares de Oliveira, ‘Business and
politics in São Tomé e Príncipe: From cocoa monoculture to petro-state’, African Affairs
102, 406 (2003), pp. 51–80.
40. Ibid.
41. See Gisa Weszkalnys, ‘The curse of oil in the Gulf of Guinea’, African Affairs 108, 433
(2009), pp. 679–89.
42. Rosaleen Duffy, ‘Global environmental governance and the challenge of shadow states:
The impact of illicit sapphire mining in Madagascar’, Development and Change 36 (2005),
pp. 825–43, p. 837.
43. ‘Big hopes for Madagascan sapphires’, Financial Times (18 August 2000).
44. Madagascar: Nouvel eldorado des compagnies minières et pétrolières (L’Association IRESA/
Initiative pour la recherche économique et sociale en Afrique sub-saharienne et les Amis de
la Terre France, Paris, November 2012).
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The second notable wave of resource boom expectations in Madagascar
arguably occurred after the 2002 political crisis following a disputed
presidential election.45 The country’s new incumbent, President Marc
Ravalomanana, ousted Didier Ratsiraka (President 1975–93 and 1997–
2002), and initiated political and economic reforms that resulted in much
greater support by foreign donors and a better investment climate for for-
eign investors. At the same time, foreign donors contributed to resource
boom expectations by helping the Malagasy government to identify new
potentially resource-rich areas. In 2003, the World Bank provided US$32
million to Madagascar for managing the country’s mineral resources. In
2004, USAID released a map that showed Madagascar’s potentially rich
gem areas in order to encourage the sale of prospecting licences to foreign
mining companies.46 Also in 2004, a US-registered company called
Madagascar Oil was granted a petroleum exploration licence (the French
oil firm Total became a partner in 2008). Over the following decade, the
government awarded hundreds of mining licences covering a wide range
of resources, including iron, nickel, cobalt, gold, ilmenite, bauxite, and
uranium. Foreign direct investment stock in Madagascar’s extractive sec-
tor increased from 47 billion to 5,800 billion ariary during the period
2005 to 2009.47
In summary, great resource boom expectations began in parallel in the
late 1990s in both countries. After a decade and a half, however, despite
these expectations, in neither country has the extractive sector fulfilled its
promise. In STP, no oil in commercial quantities has been found to date
and oil production has not yet commenced. By 2013, the French oil
multinational Total and the Swiss-based Addax Petroleum (a subsidiary
of China’s Sinopec) had abandoned four of six oil concession areas in the
Joint Development Zone following disappointing oil exploration results,
while two concessions in the Zone have never been developed at all.48
In Madagascar, some mining activities have started: artisanal sapphire
mining from the late 1990s, and an ilmenite mine owned by the Anglo-
Australian mining firm Rio Tinto that began production in March 2009.
However, the formal mining sector has had little impact on Madagascar’s
real economy since the 1990s. According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Madagascar’s mining sector made up 0.6 percent of GDP
in 2010, compared with 0.5 percent in 1995.49 Even if we count the arti-
sanal sector in the informal economy, the mining share of GDP was
45. On the 2002 political crisis, see Solofo Randrianja, ‘“Be not afraid, only believe”:
Madagascar 2002’, African Affairs 102, 407 (2003), pp. 309–29.
46. Duffy, ‘Global environmental governance and the challenge of shadow states’.
47. Madagascar: Nouvel eldorado des compagnies minières et pétrolières.
48. ‘São Tomé e Príncipe – Total loss’, Africa Confidential 54 (19) (20 September 2013).
49. IMF, Regional economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, Washington, DC, October
2012), p. 56.
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estimated to be no more than 3 percent in 2005.50 Artisanal mining had
only limited impact on the rest of Malagasy society because almost all of
the sapphires, rubies, and topaz extracted by illegal artisanal miners are
believed to be exported tax-free outside the control of the Malagasy
state.51 In comparison, the tertiary sector, the agricultural sector, and the
manufacturing sector made up 53.9 percent, 28.4 percent, and 11.1 per-
cent of Madagascar’s GDP in 2010, respectively.52 The significance of
natural resource extraction for Madagascar has remained limited. The
sapphire boom in artisanal mining did not prove lasting, with sapphire
production reportedly declining by the 2010s.53 Commercial production
from the large foreign-owned Ambatovy nickel mine started in 2014, but
other projects have failed to materialize. Rio Tinto announced in early
2013 that it was scaling back its plans and would only operate one mine in
Madagascar, rather than the scheduled three; by the end of 2013, Rio
Tinto announced job losses at the remaining mine.54 In 2015, the
Ambatovy mine was hit by low nickel prices and was forced to lay off
about 1,000 staff.55 Indeed, the World Bank noted in 2010 that
‘Madagascar will possibly enter the ranks of resource-rich economies over
the next two decades’.56
Therefore, we surmise that STP and Madagascar provide excellent case
studies for investigating the impact of resource boom expectations in the
absence of significant natural resource extraction, and the approximate
15-year period from about 1998 to 2013 provides the timeframe for our
investigation.
Economic impact of resource boom expectations
Expectations of future resource booms can assume material forms, given
that foreign investors are willing to pay handsomely for exploration rights
even without any tangible proof that resources are commercially viable.
Most notably, it is customary for extractive companies to pay signature
bonuses for obtaining exploration licences from sovereign governments.
50. The Economist, ‘Getting stoned – Madagascar’ (30 July 2005).
51. ‘Madagascar – Plunder unabated’, Africa Confidential 53 (18) (7 September 2012).
52. IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, p. 56.
53. Andrew Walsh, ‘After the rush: Living with uncertainty in a Malagasy mining town’,
Africa 82 (2012), pp. 235–51.
54. Jessica Hatcher, ‘The white stuff: Mining giant Rio Tinto unearths unrest in
Madagascar’, Time (8 February 2013); Industrial Global Union, ‘Mass dismissals at Rio
Tinto in Madagascar’, 31 July 2013, <http://www.industriall-union.org/mass-dismissals-at-
rio-tinto-in-madagascar> (19 December 2016).
55. Lovasoa Rabary, ‘Madagascar Ambatovy mine workers won’t strike, want talks on lay-
offs’, Reuters (12 June 2015).
56. World Bank, ‘Madagascar: Governance and development effectiveness review’ (Report
No. 54277-MG, Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit Africa Region, World
Bank, Washington, DC, 2010), p. xiv.
243THE RESOURCE CURSE WITHOUT NATURAL RESOURCES
Indeed, while STP and Madagascar did not produce any natural
resources, both countries obtained sizeable speculative signature bonuses.
In STP, several oil companies – including the US firm Chevron Texaco
and China’s Sinopec – paid $49 million (561.5 billion dobra) in signature
bonuses in 2005 and $29 million (413 billion dobra) in 2007.57 This
inflow of funds had a considerable economic impact given that signature
bonuses represented almost 43 percent of the country’s GDP in 2005,
and 20 percent of GDP in 2007.58 Despite this windfall, government
spending in 2005 and in 2007 actually fell compared to the previous year,
as seen in Figure 1. Instead, Figure 1 shows that, with spending having
increased to record levels during 2003–4 and 2005–6, the government
Figure 1 STP government expenditure (billions of dobra), year-on-year
change in government expenditure, and government surplus/deficit
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2015/01/weodata/index.aspx>.
Note: From 2007–9 STP secured large-scale debt relief from HIPC, MDRI, and the Paris
Club. Since this does not reflect revenue that can be spent we have removed this from the
budget deficit (dotted line).
57. IMF staff country report 06/349 (IMF, Washington, DC, October 2006).
58. IMF staff country report 12/34 (IMF, Washington, DC, February 2012), p. 6.
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deficit was largest in 2004 and 2006 (that is, in the years preceding the
windfalls of 2005 and 2007), despite previous praise from the IMF
regarding fiscal management in 2002. To provide an idea of the relative
scale of the change in government expenditure, Figure 2 shows that since
1996 (the year before the first deal with ERHC) government spending
increased from 24.1 percent to a peak of 58.7 percent of GDP in 2004.
This evidence is consistent with the argument that high resource expecta-
tions fuelled government spending, but Figure 3 also illustrates the rela-
tively high but increasingly volatile economic growth in this period. In
Figure 4 we calculate this volatility by measuring the changes in the stand-
ard error of growth rates between time periods. A line that is close to the
horizontal axis indicates small growth volatility across the decades, some-
thing that is considered a desirable macroeconomic objective. For STP,
though, we find that the line is volatile across the time period, always well
above or below the horizontal.
The period before the first signature bonus of 2005 provides compelling
evidence that government spending increased as a result of the prospect
of signature bonuses and the not unreasonable anticipation of future oil
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Madagascar STP
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
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revenues. The picture in 2007 is complicated somewhat by STP receiving
large-scale debt relief, the expectation of which may potentially have
caused some of the increased government spending in 2006. However,
while it is hard to know whether expected debt relief results in large
increases in government expenditure, we can offer tentative evidence that
this is not the case based on the experience of the large debt relief in
2009. Figure 1 illustrates a large increase in spending in 2009 but not
immediately before, suggesting that any expected debt relief windfall
could not be reallocated before it was received. An obvious explanation is
that – in marked contrast to signature bonuses – debt relief came with
conditions to adopt sounder fiscal policies and to ensure money was spent
on poverty reduction programmes through a poverty reduction strategy
paper – and thus political decision makers were less likely to anticipate
that these payments would actually materialize.59
The large nominal and relative increases in expenditure in 2009 and
beyond (seen in Figures 1 and 2) were funded mainly by grants and over-
seas development aid in capital expenditure in support of the Public
Investment Programme. But STP remains vulnerable to debt distress
because expected oil revenues have failed to materialize, an outcome sig-
nalled by the withdrawal of several large oil exploration companies (the
last of which was in 2013). There were large government deficits in five of
the six years between 2009 and 2014 as tax revenues declined.60 Because
this negative outlook for a resource boom has been confirmed relatively
recently, as yet it has had no impact on government spending. It is also
harder to reduce government spending in the wake of negative resource
expectations, an argument supported by extensive scholarship in both
economics and political science suggesting that it is considerably more
difficult for governments to cut than to increase state spending, especially
in politically unstable contexts.61 Hence some inertia on behalf of the
STP government response should be expected.
59. The large increase in government spending stemmed from overseas development
assistance in financing the public investment programme to improve infrastructure (telecom-
munications and transport, for example), education, and health. For more information see
the IMF staff country report 14/9 (IMF, Washington, DC, January 2014).
60. IMF staff country report 14/2 (IMF, Washington, DC, December 2013), p. 33.
61. See Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, ‘A positive theory of fiscal deficits and govern-
ment debt’, Review of Economic Studies 57, 3 (1990), pp. 403–14; Leonardo R. Arriola,
‘Patronage and political stability in Africa’, Comparative Political Studies 42 (2009), pp. 1339–62;
Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The crises of democratic capitalism’, New Left Review 71 (2011), pp. 5–29.
Alesia and Tabellini note that the limits to the extent to which governments are able to impose
government spending cuts are particularly pronounced when politics is more polarized and
when a government’s grip on political power is more tenuous, with the consequence that govern-
ment spending cuts become less likely and debt levels will increase commensurately. Conversely,
as Arriola points out, governments can buy stability by co-opting key interest groupings. Hence,
particularly in unstable political contexts, it is considerably more difficult for governments to cut
than to increase state spending.
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A comparison between STP and Cape Verde is instructive. Cape Verde
is another island economy of similar size that shares a Portuguese colonial
history, but lacks any natural resource prospects. Figure 4 demonstrates
that growth in Cape Verde was much less erratic (closer to the horizontal)
over the same time period, thus offering further support to the idea that
false resource-boom expectations can have adverse effects on a country.
In Madagascar, signature bonuses were considerably larger than in
STP. For example, the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation reportedly
made signature bonus payments of $140 million in 2010 for an iron ore
exploration licence.62 However, unlike those in STP, signature bonuses in
Madagascar were not transparent (see the next section). A closer inspec-
tion of government revenue indicates a significant increase between 2009
and 2010, but also shows that the 2009 political crisis resulted in a very
steep decline in revenue and expenditure. We conclude that some of this
signature bonus is reflected in the 2010 government revenue but that,
because of the military coup in 2009, it is not possible to say whether
there was an increase in government expenditure prior to 2010 based on
an expected windfall and expected resource boom.
In Madagascar the expected sapphire boom contributed to a period of
low but sustained economic growth from the mid-1990 s to the 2002 pol-
itical crisis (see Figure 5). Government spending as a share of GDP
remained around 18 percent in this period (see Figure 2), and year-on-
year changes were modest and flat (see Figure 6), consistent with the fact
that the central government had no control over the artisanal mining prac-
tices as a source of extracting tax or of attracting signature bonuses. The
story is different during the 2000s with the subsequent expected natural
resource boom. Between 2003 and 2008 economic growth averaged 6.1
percent, and nominal government spending increased threefold
(Figure 6). Government spending spiked from 15 to 25 percent of GDP
between 2002 and 2004 and remained over 21 percent until 2008
(Figure 2), consistent with the argument that an expected resource boom
triggered both a nominal and a relative increase in government spending.
This period also saw an increase in the deficit between government rev-
enue and expenditure. With the resource boom failing to materialize, and
in the wake of President Ravalomana’s flight from Madagascar in March
2009 following a period of civil unrest, the economy shrank significantly.
This coincided with an increasingly large deficit caused by spending
increases. Analysing Figure 5 in more detail, it is clear that periods of eco-
nomic prosperity tend to be followed by a period of uncertainty triggered
by social unrest. Expected resource booms may well have contributed to
the recent economic and social events in Madagascar. When we analyse
62. ‘Miner’s missing millions’, Africa-Asia Confidential 5, 9 (July 2012).
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growth volatility (Figure 4), we find this has increased over the decades
but is also far more volatile when compared to another neighbouring
island economy, namely Comoros.
Ultimately in both countries the prevalence of resource curse effects
such as over-optimistic expectations about signature bonuses and other
future benefits from a resource boom have contributed to periods of
increased government spending and economic growth, but also – as hopes
were dashed – to significant shrinkages, worsening deficits, and, to differ-
ent extents, greater economic and social volatility.
Governance impact of resource boom expectations
Expectations of future natural resources appear to have had an impact on
governance in both STP and Madagascar by creating new state institu-
tions. As one author noted with reference to STP, oil administration ‘has
become, without a doubt, one of the most developed parts of STP’s pub-
lic administration today’.63 STP created the Ministry of Natural
Resources, the National Petroleum Agency, the Oversight Commission,
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Figure 5 GDP annual growth rates (PPP) in Madagascar (1981–2015)
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
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63. Weszkalnys, ‘Anticipating oil’, p. 218.
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the Public Information Office, and the Joint Development Authority.64
Likewise, Madagascar established the Ministry of Mines, the Office of the
Mining Cadastre/BCMM, the National Mining Committee, the Office of
National Mines and Strategic Industries/OMNIS, and the Mining Police
Force.65 The creation of these institutions was largely intended to
improve the effectiveness and transparency of state institutions charged
with overseeing natural resource development. Yet, while these institu-
tions absorbed significant state funding and decision-maker attention in
the absence of significant resource extraction, they failed to arrest increas-
ingly unfavourable perceptions of governance in both countries (see dis-
cussion of Figure 7 below).
One methodological problem in evaluating the governance impact of
resource extraction is the hidden nature of corrupt dealings that may be
an integral part of transactions with government but may not be known or
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64. Ibid.
65. World Bank, ‘Madagascar’.
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prosecuted. However, there is an extensive theoretical and empirical lit-
erature that explores opportunities for corruption amongst public officials
and political incumbents.66 Resource inflows, but in particular signature
bonuses, offer at least two clear opportunities for corrupt behaviour in
public office. First, if there is a competitive bidding process for signature
bonuses, then principal–agent problems arise whereby all bidders can be
extorted by the political incumbents who grant these bonuses, or corrupt
deals are done that benefit both parties. Second, the revenue can be seized
by political incumbents who exploit their first-mover advantage, given the
risk of being ousted by an opposition grouping using either democratic or
undemocratic means.67 In other words, incumbents have an interest in
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Figure 7 Perceptions of governance in Madagascar and STP
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank.
66. For early theoretical work see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A study in political
economy (Academic Press, New York, NY, 1978) and Robert Klitgaard, Controlling corruption
(University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1988). For empirical evidence of government
embezzlement and ‘kick-back’ payments, see for example Ritva Reinikka and Jakob
Svensson, ‘Local capture: Evidence from a central government transfer program in Uganda’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 2 (2004), pp. 679–706; Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico
Moretti, ‘Did Iraq cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, bribes, and the oil and food pro-
gram’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 4 (2006), pp. 1211–48.
67. Richard Damania and Erwin Bulte, ‘Resources for sale: Corruption, democracy and the
resource curse’ (Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, 2005),
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exploiting and magnifying expectations in order to maximize their rents,
given future uncertainties around their position. Hence, although corrup-
tion may increase political instability, the latter is likely to enhance the
incentives to be corrupt.68
In STP, expectations of future oil resources appear to have had a sig-
nificant impact on the nature of corruption, as the opportunities for rent
seeking and corrupt behaviour among government officials reportedly
shifted from a previous focus on foreign aid towards a focus on oil sector
payments.69 São Tomese politics are characterized by frequent changes in
legislative majorities, giving incumbent politicians a strong incentive to
maximize rents whilst in office. Writing in 2005, one observer argued that
oil prospects in STP opened the risk of elites succumbing to ‘the lure of
quick and easy money’.70 Indeed, one economic study specifically found
that corrupt rent-seeking behaviour in STP increased as a result of expec-
tations of a future oil boom, and that there was an accompanying change
in the allocation of public resources – for example, by increasing the gov-
ernment’s allocation of foreign scholarships, which are regarded as facili-
tating future political power.71 Weszkalnys argues that a ‘politics of
anticipation emerged’, testing weak political institutions to their limit,
with ‘bad oil mapping out its own political space’.72 This led to the assem-
bly of ‘multiple entities for managing oil’ and also suspicion, uncertainty,
and instability.73
Already the early choice of the small, unknown firm ERHC as a partner
in 1997 was highly controversial, as ERHC was granted the right to four
oil blocs of its choice despite being ‘on the brink of bankruptcy’ and
unable to pay the full amount it owed to the government.74 ERHC lacked
financial resources or the technical expertise to exploit ultra-deep water
oil and gas reserves but this was made up for by close ties to prominent
politicians.75
Following a bitter dispute between ERHC and the STP government,
the Nigerian Chrome consortium purchased a controlling interest in
ERHC. While the agreement between the government and ERHC was
pp. 1–41; Larry Diamond and Jack Mosbacher, ‘Petroleum to the people: Africa’s coming
resource curse – and how to avoid it’, Foreign Affairs 92 (September–October 2013), p. 86.
68. Daniel Treisman, ‘The causes of corruption: A cross-national study’, Journal of Public
Economics 76, 3 (2000), pp. 399–457.
69. Frynas et al., ‘Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe’.
70. Glenn Brigaldino, ‘Oil boom or bust ahead for São Tomé et Príncipe’, Review of
African Political Economy 32 (2005), pp. 185–97, p. 186.
71. Vicente, ‘Does oil corrupt?’
72. Weszkalnys, ‘Anticipating oil’, p. 217.
73. Ibid., p. 231.
74. Gerhard Seibert, ‘São Tomé et Príncipe: The difficult transition from international aid
recipient to oil-producer’, in Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (eds), Resource politics in
sub-Saharan Africa (Institut für Afrika-Kunde, Hamburg, 2005), p. 227.
75. Ibid., p. 241.
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re-negotiated in 2001, the new agreement was still exceedingly favourable
to the Chrome consortium. It included the option to acquire a 15 percent
share in two oil blocks of Chrome’s choice in the Joint Development Zone
and a 100 percent share in two oil blocks in the country’s Exclusive
Economic Zone without paying any signature bonus, which was most
unusual and to the country’s disadvantage.76 During the licence bidding
rounds, STP came under intense pressure from Nigeria to grant a signifi-
cant amount of the acreage to small, inexperienced Nigerian firms, such
as Momo Oil and Godsonic Oil and Gas, which had close ties to the
Nigerian presidency.77 The Nigerian business interests in STP were
accused of major irregularities. For example, the government’s most
senior public servant declared that he could not find any record of any
payments from the Joint Development Zone with Nigeria to the treasury
in 2009, despite claims that such payments had been made.78
The influx of oil-related payments influenced the wider political process
in STP, starting with the 2001 and 2002 elections when Nigerian,
Angolan, and Taiwanese interests funded political parties. It is argued
that ‘vote buying has increasingly become an integral part of electoral
competition in the impoverished archipelago’,79 and more importantly
that increased political vote buying was ‘indicative of increased competi-
tiveness for state resources’ as a result of expectations of a future oil
boom.80 For example, there were strong allegations that Emeka Offor of
Chrome Oil supported President Trovoada’s election campaigning by the
early 2000s.81 In general, it is more than a coincidence that ‘the prospect
of the first petro-dollars coincided with more expensive political cam-
paigning and the entry of new actors’.82
In Madagascar, the governance impact of the first wave of future
resource boom expectations was relatively limited due to the artisanal
nature of the sapphire sector. As the World Bank observed, in contrast to
sectors such as gold and rosewood, where the Malagasy political elites
were able to control well-developed networks and capture resource rents,
‘sapphire rushes have created open access to rents for newcomers, beyond
the control of elites’.83 Most sapphire miners worked without government
permits, there were many independent middlemen, and there were many
76. Frynas et al., ‘Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe’.
77. John Ghazvinian, Untapped: The scramble for Africa’s oil (Houghton Miffin, Orlando,
2007), p. 230.
78. ‘São Tomé e Príncipe – The candidates line up’, Africa Confidential 52, 8 (15 April 2011).
79. ‘São Tomé e Príncipe – Pinto da Costa back in office’, Africa Confidential 52, 17
(26 August 2011).
80. Vicente, ‘Does oil corrupt?’ p. 29.
81. Frynas et al., ‘Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe’.
82. Ibid., p. 70.
83. World Bank, ‘Madagascar’, p. 55.
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foreign buyers from different countries.84 In 1999, the Malagasy govern-
ment banned the award of sapphire permits, a move that the World Bank
dubbed ‘an ill-designed decision by a partially blind central state’.85 The
permit ban lasted until 2005 and further prevented the political elites
from controlling the sapphire sector.
The second wave of resource boom expectations from 2003 had a more
substantial impact on governance in Madagascar. All access to extractive
exploration areas in search of iron, ilmenite, or other resources was regu-
lated by a government-administered permit system. The number of gov-
ernment permits awarded to extractive companies increased from around
30 permits in 2002 to well over 1,300 awarded in 2008.86 By 2009, the
growth in awarded permits represented some 216,000 square kilometres,
or more than 35 percent of Madagascar’s total surface area.87 In 2008 and
2009, the government reportedly collected revenues of about 10 billion
ariary (about $5 million) from the mining administrative fee.88 While this
amount is relatively low and one would normally expect much greater rev-
enues from licensing, recent research provides a possible explanation in
that sub-optimal separation of powers among government regulators
responsible for natural resource licensing may be driving high levels of
corruption and rent-seeking opportunities in resource-rich countries. In
other words, many payments for licences may have been made as unre-
ported bribes.89 Hence, licensing probably represented an increase in
rent-seeking opportunities for the Malagasy political elite, even if it is
impossible to obtain any tangible evidence of their scale.
Until 2005–6, the permit system was reportedly administered in a rela-
tively transparent manner. By 2006, the World Bank noted that incidents
of ‘political interference in mining rights management, sometimes in open
violation of existing regulations, have called into question the transparent
governance of mining rights’.90 For example, gold mining rights were
awarded by presidential decree to an entity controlled by the military in
2006 under highly dubious circumstances, while the terms of a previously
transparent auction for iron ore permits were amended in 2008 and
became highly opaque.91 It would appear that corrupt rent seeking contin-
ued following the 2009 coup. As a notable illustration, the Malagasy
84. Ibid., Annex IV.
85. Ibid., p. 112.
86. Ibid., p. 41.
87. Ibid., p. 40.
88. Ibid., pp. 40–1.
89. Luca J. Uberti, ‘Is separation of powers a remedy for the resource curse? Firm licens-
ing, corruption and mining development in post-war Kosovo’, New Political Economy
19 (2014), pp. 695–722.
90. World Bank, ‘Madagascar’, p. 41.
91. Ibid., p. 42.
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government claimed to have received $100 million from the Wuhan Iron
and Steel Corporation in 2010, but the Chinese company later protested
that they actually paid $140 million.92 Indeed, the 2009 coup represented
a transition from a Malagasy state dependent on foreign aid (almost 70
percent of government revenues in 2008) towards a reliance on rent-
seeking opportunities related to natural resources and future expectations
of natural resource booms, given that international aid to Madagascar was
mostly frozen following the coup. The World Bank commented in 2010
that ‘by limiting the need for revenue collection e.g. through taxation,
mining revenues risk further weakening the accountability of the Malagasy
state to its citizens and further undermining the capacity of state
institutions’.93
In both countries, it is clear that the prevalence of resource curse effects
on governance was already apparent before either country started produ-
cing any significant resources. Governance indicators presented in
Figure 7 corroborate this story. These indicators show that for both
Madagascar and STP governance has always been perceived as poor but
certainly worsened from around the onset of expectations of future
resource booms: after 1997 in STP and after 2003 in Madagascar. There
were obvious differences between both countries owing to their different
historical and political trajectories. With regard to STP, the ‘strong social
bonds [within the small elite of the country] and pressures and the
absence of a large number of groups for sharing the pay-offs made plun-
der more feasible’.94 In contrast, the political elite in Madagascar was
broader and considerably more prone to violent intra-elite conflicts (see
section below). However, while there were different mechanisms of con-
flict and accommodation in STP and in Madagascar, perceptions of cor-
rupt rent-seeking behaviour appear to have increased in both countries as
a result of expectations of future resource booms.
In recent years, however, there was a divergence of expectations in the
two countries. In Madagascar, expectations of future resource booms
increased and were partly confirmed by the actual presence of Ambatovy
and Rio Tinto (see above). The accountability of government institutions
further diminished, as demonstrated most notably by the removal of the
de facto authority of the Office of the Mining Cadastre/BCMM (an arm’s-
length agency under the authority of the Ministry of Mines) by the execu-
tive branch of Madagascar’s government after 2009. In marked contrast
in STP, expectations of future resource booms declined after disappoint-
ing results from deep-sea oil explorations. These factors led to the
92. ‘Miner’s missing millions’, Africa-Asia Confidential 5, 9 (July 2012).
93. World Bank, ‘Madagascar’, p. xiv.
94. Frynas et al., ‘Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe’, p. 77.
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departure of major foreign oil companies Exxon, Chevron, Sinopec, and
finally Total in 2013. The 2014 IMF staff country report on STP praised
the new coalition government that came into office in December 2012 for
‘the pursuit of sound financial policies’ in the face of ‘more uncertain oil
prospects’, pointing to their commitment to fiscal prudence and a series
of undertaken and planned financial reforms related to fiscal administra-
tion improvement, tax payments, and bank transparency, among other
concerns.95 In other words, the decreased expectations in STP appear to
have forced the STP government to initiate fiscal reforms and to focus on
non-oil sectors. These recent developments can help to explain the diver-
gent perceptions of governance in the two countries from the late 2000s: a
deterioration of governance as perceived in Madagascar, and a slight
improvement in STP (see Figure 7).
Conflict impact of resource boom expectations
Natural resource booms raise political stakes and arguably create a dis-
tinct ‘political ecology’.96 If, as noted above, politicians and government
officials in unstable political environments have a greater incentive to cap-
italize on their first-mover advantage through corruption, opposition fac-
tions have greater incentives to seize power and may issue promises to
excluded commercial interests in return for support. Indeed, a 2010 study
by Päivi Lujala found that oil and gas reserves, whether exploited or not,
can worsen conflicts, as competing players seek to mould or pre-empt the
consequences of future distributions.97
Our findings show that expectations of future resource booms only
started to exert impacts on political decision making in STP from the late
1990s and in Madagascar after 2003. One could make a counter-factual
argument that it was precisely because resource expectations were low
before the late 1990s that peaceful democratization was possible in both
countries. Echoing previous well-known findings by Michael Ross that
petroleum exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule,98
research by Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon found a negative
correlation between the presence of a sizable natural resource sector and
the level of democracy in Africa. They concluded that post-Cold War
democratic reforms in Africa have been successful only in resource-poor
countries such as Benin, Mali and Madagascar.99
95. IMF staff country report on STP 04/108 (IMF, Washington, DC, April 2004).
96. Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war’.
97. Lujala, ‘The spoils of nature’.
98. Michael L. Ross, ‘Does oil hinder democracy?’, World Politics 53 (2001), pp. 325–61.
99. Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon, ‘Resource wealth and political regimes in
Africa’, Comparative Political Studies 37 (2004), pp. 816–41.
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Following this argument, given that both STP and Madagascar lacked a
sizeable natural resource sector, one would expect them to be potentially
more stable and democratic than resource-rich countries in Africa.
Indeed, it has been observed that the political competition in STP was
extremely peaceful until the 1990s and ‘even the military coup in 1995
was a mostly bloodless event and was quickly resolved in a peaceful man-
ner, ending with the restoration of civilian rule’.100 Madagascar experi-
enced more violent conflicts, most notably the 2002 stand-off between
the two presidential candidates Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, which saw
the emergence of rival militias that engaged in sporadic violence. But the
2002 crisis ended peacefully with a return to the rule of law and democ-
racy, and it was pointed out at the time that Madagascar’s rulers had
strong incentives to sustain political stability and to base the country’s
wealth creation on ‘the low cost of labour’, given that ‘Madagascar pos-
sesses few strategic commodities’.101
Following the logic of the resource curse, the expectations of future
resource booms should have introduced a distortion of the political land-
scape by raising the stakes of political competitions, as the political actors
expected to obtain access to natural resource rents in future. In particular,
one would anticipate that future expectations would have played an
important role in major disturbances: the 2003 coup in STP and the 2009
coup in Madagascar. The 2003 coup in STP was primarily a direct
response to non-oil related factors, above all, a small group of highly
trained ex-soldiers facing economic hardship and poor pay and working
conditions in the São Tomean army. It was no more violent than the pre-
vious 1995 coup, which happened before the rise of future oil expecta-
tions.102 However, while natural resources were not the main driving
force, the coup reflected, at least in part, a product of interest in potential
oil revenues, the prospects of easy wealth, and the belief that a few senior
politicians had bought luxury cars for their secretaries and children, whilst
most remained poor.103 The expectations of a future oil boom also influ-
enced the timing of the coup, given that ‘the rebels wanted to denounce
the unequal distribution of the country’s resources before the oil revenue
arrived’, and they were aware of the ‘possibility that, after the arrival of
the first petrodollars, the government would be able to buy off any poten-
tial opposition’.104
100. Frynas et al., ‘Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe’, p. 78.
101. Randrianja, ‘“Be not afraid, only believe”’, p. 329.
102. On the 2003 political crisis, see Gerhard Seibert, ‘The bloodless coup of July 16 in
São Tomé e Príncipe’, Lusotopie (2003), pp. 245–60.
103. Ghazvinian, Untapped, p. 227; Afrol News, ‘São Tomé coup is over’ (23 July 2003),
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The coup plotters’ demands also provide indications that the 2003
coup was at least partly motivated by the greed associated with oil-related
rent seeking in STP. Daunted by the challenges of political power, the
coup plotters stepped down one week later in return for an amnesty and
an agreement which they signed with the government. The agreement
largely reflected the economic demands of the soldiers involved; signifi-
cantly, ‘political demands were either absent or remained rather vague’.105
Among other concessions, the agreement provided the army’s supreme
command with access to information about the oil sector. According to a
well-informed São Tomé expert, ‘this provision reflected both the mili-
tary’s concerns regarding the lack of transparency with regard to the oil
sector and their intention to participate in the expected oil rush’.106
The 2009 coup in Madagascar in which soldiers seized key sites and
installed the mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, as the country’s
president was primarily a direct response to non-oil related factors. In par-
ticular, it was driven by a mutiny among dissatisfied soldiers and a long-
standing conflict between Rajoelina and the country’s president, Marc
Ravalomanana.107 However, government actions after 2009 provide indi-
cations that the prospects of natural resources provided strong incentives
for the coup leaders to cling to power, particularly given reduced overseas
aid. As one of its first notable policy decisions following the coup, the new
government relieved BCMM of the de facto authority to allocate extractive
permits, which henceforth were granted directly by the executive branch
of the government through the Minister of Mining. Furthermore, in
January 2010, the Ministry of Mines passed a decree that doubled the
level of mining administration fees, in violation of the country’s mining
code.108 While ultimately we cannot know how important future natural
resource revenues were in the decision-making process, these actions pro-
vide clear evidence that the coup leaders anticipated future resource
income. According to the World Bank, ‘commitments within the domin-
ant elite coalition are fluid and unstable, shocks can easily lead to violence
and the rise of new coalitions’.109
In summary, natural resources were not necessarily the primary motives
for the coups in STP and in Madagascar; the motives for coups were inev-
itably complex and we do not have any solid evidence on the perceptions
of actors involved in the conflicts. Nonetheless, there are indications that
first-mover incentives in anticipation of future resources have, at least
105. Ibid., p. 257.
106. Ibid.
107. On the 2009 political crisis, see Solofo Randrianja, Madagascar, le coup d’état de mars
2009 (Karthala, Paris, 2012).
108. World Bank, ‘Madagascar’.
109. Ibid., p. xviii.
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partly, fuelled the activities of potential coup leaders and other violent
forms of political opposition, as predicted by the resource curse thesis. At
this point, while we still need to be cautious about our conclusions on the
link between future expectations and conflict, there are first-mover incen-
tives for power seekers who are able to issue ‘promissory notes’ to com-
mercial interests seeking to gain minerals concessions in times of resource
hype, and, in turn, are able to secure greater financial muscle in support
of their endeavours.
Conclusions
We do not hold a deterministic view of resource curse effects. We do not
argue that resource curse effects are inevitable, and there is important
counter-evidence in the case of some countries and for specific periods of
time.110 On the one hand, the quality of societal governance may help to
reduce resource curse effects – by reducing the scope for corruption, for
example.111 On the other hand, government policies have the potential to
reduce resource curse effects.112 A recent study in this journal suggested
that Ghana may possibly combine both a good quality of societal govern-
ance and skilful government policies that will help to shield the country
from resource curse effects.113 At the same time, there is evidence not
only that historically high and volatile commodity markets are associated
with greater speculative activity, but also that the effects of the resource
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pp. 1146–70; James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, ‘Fiscal transparency, political parties,
and debt in OECD countries’, European Economic Review 50 (2006), pp. 1403–39. See also
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curse have worsened since the early 1990s.114 The long energy transition,
in turn, has offered particular encouragement to financially reckless
behaviour around the possibility of future petroleum windfalls, with a
potential impact on countries and how they are governed.115
We have found that both STP and Madagascar have experienced at
least some resource curse effects, even without the actual exploitation of
substantial resources. The resource curse effects were most evident with
regard to economic and governance issues, including volatile economic
growth and deteriorated governance. In other words, our findings suggest
that it is indeed possible to experience at least some dimensions of the
resource curse as a result of excessive hype. The propensity for breathless
announcements by the extractive industries of massive natural resource
prospects that rarely live up to their initial promise may thus have far
more malign effects than those visited on gullible investors and creditors.
Past empirical research focused almost exclusively on the tangible pres-
ence of natural resources and a country’s dependence on natural resource
income or exports as key indicators; it neglected the importance of future
expectations. Future studies may fruitfully develop research methodolo-
gies for measuring expectations and comparing them between different
localities: this would account more accurately for the variability of
resource curse effects between countries and help provide recommenda-
tions on how to reduce resource curse effects.
114. Wood and Lane, ‘Institutions, change and diversity’; Lane and Wood, ‘Capitalist
diversity’; Gail Tverberg, ‘Oil supply limits and the continuing financial crisis’, Energy 37
(2012), pp. 27–34; Andersen and Ross, ‘The big oil change’.
115. Heinberg, Snake oil; Kotze. ‘Debt, defaults and crises’.
260 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
